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Imposing Criminal Liability on
Government Officials Under
Environmental Law: A Legal and
Economic Analysis
MICHAEL G. FAURE,* INGEBORG M. KOOPMANS, * AND
JOkANNES C. OUDUK'**
I. INTRODUCrION
Most countries base environmental policy primarily on a
"command and control" approach of permits and licenses. In this
system, governmental agencies play a crucial role because they can
determine the legally permitted amount of pollution. For example,
they may set emission standards through the use of permits and
licenses. Therefore, how agencies perform their duties can strongly
impact environmental quality in a particular region. For instance,
if an agency wrongfully issues permits to certain industries, the
agency's conduct has a direct influence on the pollution of the
environment. Hence, lawyers ask whether government officials
who wrongfully issue permits are criminally liable if their behavior
contributes to environmental pollution. Legal scholars, especially
in Germany, increasingly consider the possibility of imposing
criminal liability on government officials, a practice called
Amtstragerstrafbarkeit.
This Article examines from an economic point of view the
tendency towards Amtstrdgerstrafbarkeit. The central questions
are: (1) how criminal liability for government officials fits into the
general economic theory of environmental law, and (2) whether
holding government officials liable under criminal law is efficient.
Part II of this Article examines the U.S. and German legal systems
* Professor of comparative and international environmental law, University of
Limburg, Maastricht, Netherlands.
** Lecturer in criminal law and criminal procedure, Tilburg University, Netherlands.
* Lecturer in criminal law and criminal procedure, Tilburg University, Netherlands.
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to provide an overview of the arguments advanced by legal
doctrine that favor and oppose criminal liability of government
officials. Part III analyzes the same problem from a legal and
economic perspective. Finally, Part V provides a few closing
remarks and concludes that imposing criminal liability on
government officials may be warranted.
II. LABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFIIciALs: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
The U.S. and German legal systems have opposing solutions
to the problem of criminal liability of government officials. U.S.
legal doctrine seems to oppose personal liability of the official,
whereas German legal scholars increasingly favor personal liability.
A. Liability of Government Officials in the United States
U.S. legal doctrine does not discuss the problem of imposing
criminal liability on government officials. Some commentators,
however, have considered the issue of holding a government
official or his agency liable in tort for damages that his actions
cause. The questions central to the issue of criminal liability also
arise in literature and case law on tort liability. Hence, the
following overview of the arguments regarding the tort liability of
agencies and government officials also applies to the problem of
criminal liability.
1. Historical Overview
Ancient Anglo-American law held that government officials
were not immune from the sanctions of law applicable to private
individuals.1 The law regarded government officials as ordinary
citizens who serve the government for a specific period of time
and, after their public term expired, return to the ranks of private
citizens. Therefore, under common law, official status did not give
government officials immunity from the law. As a result, plaintiffs
could sue them for damages their acts caused, even though the
officials performed the acts in the course of their official duty.2
Miller v. Horton3 demonstrates this common law principle. In
Miller v. Horton, a Massachusetts statute empowered health
1. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 557 (2d ed. 1984).
2. Id. at 558.
3. 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891); see SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 566.
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officers to examine horses believed to be infected with glanders,
and to destroy and bury all diseased animals in order to prevent
spreading this contagious disease.4  A farmer sued the health
officer who had ordered destruction of the farmer's horse. The
court found that the horse was not infected and, because the
statute only authorized the officer to destroy infected horses, he
committed an. unauthorized act by killing a healthy horse.5 The
defendant's official status did not preclude his liability.6
2. From Liability of Government Officials Towards Immunity
Over the past few decades, the common law rule of Miller v.
Horton changed radically. Liability of government officials
increasingly moved towards immunity of government officials.
Judges comprise an important class of public officers that the
common law traditionally exempted from its strict rule of liability.7
The main justification for this exception is that allowing defeated
litigants to sue a judge would destroy the proper administration of
justice. Liability of judges would be inconsistent with a judge's
freedom to act upon personal convictioris absent apprehension of
personal consequences, and would destroy judicial independence
without which a judiciary could be neither respectable nor useful.'
Courts have extended the immunity enjoyed by judges to
administrative officials exercising adjudicatory functions. As with
members of the judiciary, administrative officials have authority to
determine private rights and obligations.9 Butz v. Economou0
confirmed the extension of judicial immunity to administrators
entrusted with adjudicatory authority. The.Butz court affirmed the
absolute immunity of officials who prosecute and hear com-
plaints."
The extension of judicial immunity to discretionary acts, such
4. 26 N.E. at 100.
5. Id. at 103.
6. Id.
7. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871); see also SCHWARTZ, supra
note 1, at 559; WALTER GELLHORN ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1166 (8th ed. 1987).
8. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5594
GELLHOR14 ET AL, supra note 7, at 1166.
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 559.
10. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
11. Id. at 478. The Court highlighted, in particular, the status of administrative law
judges whose judicial role and dignity require that they be vested with the absolute
immunity that shields judges in the courts. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 560.
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as issuing permits and licenses, further expanded the range of
official immunity. Both federal courts and several state courts have
held that government officials normally are not liable in tort for
discretionary acts, even if the official makes a choice that is beyond
his power.12  Consequently, an official having statutory authority
to issue a license or permit will, not be liable under common law
for damages arising out of his wrongful issuance of a permit or
license. 3  If the official does not have discretionary power,
however, and his duties are "ministerial," he can be held liable for
failure to perform those duties.
14
In Barr v. Matteo,'5 the Supreme Court affirmed the exten-
sion of official immunity. The Court defined official immunity in
the broadest terms:
It is important that government officials be free to exercise their
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damages suits for acts done
in the course of those duties. Such suits would consume time
and energy, which would otherwise be devoted to governmental
service. The threat of such suits might also appreciably inhibit
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of government
policies.'
6
Barr was significant in that it extended the principle of government
officials' immunity to every officer in the entire federal bureaucracy
acting within the scope of his duty.1
7
12. See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 240 (1965).
13. Id.
14. Consequently, only officials at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy are
generally personally liable because they are the only ones who do not exercise discretionary
power. According to Jaffe, the distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" is at
least unclear, and immunity, in terms of discretionary power, represents a balancing of
certain important factors, such as the character and severity of the plaintiff's injury, the
existence of alternative remedies, the capacity of a court or jury to evaluate the propriety
of the official 's action, and the impact of liability on the official or the treasury for
effective administration of law. See id. at 241.
15. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
16. Id. at 571.
17. Courts have applied Barr v. Mateo to officers far down in the administrative
hierarchy, including a deputy U.S. marshal, an Internal Revenue Service collection officer,
and a Health, Education and Welfare claims representative. See Norton v. McShane, 332
F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961); Poss v.
Liebermann, 299 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1962). Thus far, however, courts have refused to extend
the rule of Barr v. Matteo to police officers sued for false arrest, false imprisonment, or
excessive force. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 561-62; GELLHORN ET AL, supra note
7 at 1168-75; JAFFE, supra note 12, at 240-44; 3 KENNETH C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
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In 1978, Butz v. Economou8 was a major break from the
Barr trend towards absolute official immunity. The Supreme Court
in Butz distinguished between the absolute official immunity
conferred upon government officials for mere wrongful acts and
the qualified immunity that protects them in case of constitutional
violations.l In Butz, the Department of Agriculture (DOA),
without issuing a warning letter, brought a proceeding to revoke or
suspend the registration of respondent's corporation." After the
hearing, the Judicial Officer of the DOA affirmed the examiner's
decision to uphold the charge, but an appellate court later reversed
the DOA's ruling.2 Respondent brought an action for damages
against petitioner officials alleging constitutional violations, such as
deprivation of procedural due process by instituting unauthorized
proceedings. The Supreme Court held that federal officials are not
absolutely immune from liability for damages arising from a
knowing violation of constitutional rights.2
The basis for the Supreme Court's decision is that a federal
official cannot receive protection for ignoring his legal limita-
tions.' An official has immunity only when a controlling federal
law authorizes his acts. Indeed, if an official can be liable for
actions beyond the limit of his statutory authority, it would ,be
incongruous not to hold the official liable for knowingly or willfully
violating constitutional rights.24  Consequently, the absolute
immunity for government officials formulated in Barr v. Matteo
does not apply in tort actions charging violations of constitutional
rights. Because plaintiffs can easily frame charges of tortious
official conduct in constitutional terms, Butz v. Economou
considerably restricted the broad range of immunity Barr offered
to government officials.
Butz, however, did not completely abolish official immunity in
the event of constitutional violations. Although it denied absolute
immunity to government officials, the Supreme Court indicated
that officials charged with constitutional violations may assert
LAW TREATISE 520-25, (1958).
18. 438 U.S. 478, 489-95 (1978).
19. Id. at 479; see SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 562.
20. Butz, 438 U.S. at 481.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 489.
24. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 563.
1996] 533
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
protection under qualified immunity.' When government official
actions cause injury or damage, qualified immunity protects
government officials unless they knew, or reasonably should have
known, that their actions would violate established constitutional
rights.
26
This evolution from liability to immunity indicates courts'
recognition that holding government officials and private individu-
als equally liable may be undesirable. Several arguments attempt
to explain this view. First, a major difference exists between the
duties that government officials and private individuals owe. An
official acts for the public interest and the community profits from
his actions; a private individual acts for his own interest and solely
derives the benefits of his actions. Also, government action would
be impossible if its officials are frequently subject to damage suits
whenever they discharge their public functions.27  Although
private parties also face the possibility of suit, public officials,
unlike private parties, do not have the option simply to refuse to
act. Hence, they are often charged with acting in coercive ways.'
Second, personal liability may paralyze the initiative of government
officials, an undesirable effect in the face of complaints that
government administration already lacks initiative.29  Third,
imposing on a government official the inherent risks of his
profession is unfair, as is imposing a duty to indemnify tort victims
from the official's personal resources. The Supreme Court referred
to this issue by stating that imposing liability on "an [official] who
25. Butz, 438 U.S. at 564.
26. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 564; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
(addressing the issue of qualified immunity).
27. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 561.
28. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 870-71 (4th ed.
1984).
29. Cases like Miller v. Horton demonstrate the danger of paralysis where the common
law rule is strictly applied. 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891). In Miller, the court held officers
liable for destroying a horse that in fact was not infected. I& The effect of personal
liability in such a case is not difficult to imagine. Although the law requires action, the
officer would think twice before destroying an infected horse because a court may decide
that the horse is not infected and, therefore, makes the killing illegal and the officer
personally liable for damages. The officer's hesitation could lead to an increased risk of
spreading the disease. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 566-67; see also JAFFE, supra note
12, at 245-57 (giving examples of the paralyzing effects of a personal liability of government
officials); EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 871, ("For officials making hundreds of decisions a
year, the situation could quickly become intolerable, with the possible result that the able
people most needed for public positions would be deterred from taking them.").
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is required, by legal obligation of his position, to exerdise discre-
tion ... is unjust."30
3. Governmental Liability
One of the basic doctrines in Anglo-American law is sovereign
immunity, which provides that a party may not sue the government
without the latter's consent. This rule applies to both federal and
state governments. 1 In the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946
(FTCA),3 2 Congress gave consent to sue the U.S. government.
The FTCA states that the United States will be liable for tort
claims "under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where'the act or omission occurred."33 This permis-
sion to sue the U.S. government, however, is not as broad as it may
appear because of the many exceptions contained in the FrCA.
Three categories of exceptions include: (1) specific administrative
functions or agencies, as well as for all claims arising in foreign
countries; (2) specific torts, including most intentional torts;' and
(3) acts and omissions of officials exercising due care in enforcing
statutes or regulations, whether or not they are valid. The
FTCA also excepts government officials exercising discretionary
30. Schreuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
31. The origin of the rule of sovereign immunity is unclear. No provision of the
Constitution dictates its implementation. The doctrine was not applied as the basis of a
decision of the Supreme Court until 1846. See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 286 (1846). The reasons for accepting the doctrine of sovereign immunity include
the argument that "the King can do no wrong" and the similarly conceptual contention that
there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. A "practical or political justification of the immunity is avoidance of undue
judicial interference in the affairs of government." GELLHORN ET AL, supra note 7, at
1150; see also JAFFE, supra note 12, at 197-231; DAVIs, supra note 17, at 434-505; EPSTEIN,
supra note 28, at 853.
32. 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291. 1346, 1402, 1504,
2110. 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-78, 2680 (1995)).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1995).
34. FTCA denies jurisdiction to the courts in case of "any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." See 28 U.S.C.'
§ 2680(h) (1995). Under a 1974 amendment to section 2680(h) of the FTCA, however, the
United States can be liable for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution committed by law enforcement officers. See Pub. L. No.
93-253, §2, 88 Stat. 50 (1974).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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functions, whether or not the official abuses the discretion.'
This last exception significantly limits the responsibility of the
federal government. In most cases where a negligent government
official commits an act-that causes damage, the official is acting in
the execution of a statute or regulation, or in the exercise of
discretionary power, and thus, the last exception of the FTCA
precludes liability for .the United States.37  The Supreme Court,
however, limited this broad exception by distinguishing between
the policy or planning level and the operational level.38 An
-example of an act at the policy, level is the decision to provide a
specific service; an act at the operational level constitutes the affir-
mative exercise of the negligent execution of the particular service.
Aside from the federal government, states also have consented
to suit for governmental tort liability. State governments increas-
ingly are making themselves liable on the same basis as private
tortfeasors, and a number of states have legislated significantly on
the 'subject of sovereign immunity.39 Along with this legislative
development, the judiciary also has made an attack on sovereign
36. 1d.
37. The principle underlying the third exception of the FTCA was the basis of a
decision in Dalehite v. United States, a test case arising from the Texas City disaster. 346
U.S. 15 (1953). In 1947, a large cargo of ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploded on board
a ship docked at Texas City. Id. at 17. The result was a gutting of the entire dock area,
more than 500 persons killed and 3000 injured, and property damage into hundreds of
millions of dollars. Id. at 48. The federal government owned the plants that manufactured
the fertilizer pursuant to government orders and specifications. Id. at 18. Under the
Marshall Plan, the government directed the fertilizer to be shipped to Europe. Under the
FTCA, plaintiffs brought more than 300 suits against the United States based on the
government's negligent handling of the fertilizer. Id. at 48. The lower court found
negligence in the production, transportation, and storage of the fertilizer, but the Supreme
Court found that the government was not liable because the incident involved discretionary
authority. Thus, the provision in the FTCA precludes actions for abuse of discretionary
power regardless of negligent conduct. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 570; JAFFE, supra
note 12, at 257-60; GELLHORN El AL., supra note 7, at 1201-02.
38. For an example of this distinction;see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
61, 69 (1955) (holding the government liable for damage to a ship caused by the Coast
Guard's negligent maintenance of a lighthouse light). The Court stated that "[t]he Coast
Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to
operate a light... and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light.... the
Coast Guard was.., obligated to use due care" to make certain that the light was kept in
good working order. Id. at 69.
39. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 573 n.2. Those states include Arkansas, California,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington. Id.
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immunity during this period.' In fact, judicial decisions
abolishing state governmental immunity from tort liability are
among the most important developments in this area. The most
significant case in this respect is Muskopf v. Coming Hospital
District,4 where the California Supreme Court ruled that "govern-
mental immunity from tort liability ... must be discarded as
mistaken and unjust."42  Sovereign immunity in tort "is an
anachronism, without rational basis, and has existed only by force
of inertia. 43  After this decision by the California court, the
courts of more than half of the states have wholly or partially
repudiated'the doctrine of sovereign immunity from torts."
4. Liability of Government Officials v. Governmental Liability
The law has shifted from liability towards immunity of
government officials. Legal doctrine proposes that this evolution
resulted in the need for governmental liability because. broad
immunity for government officials left the injured individual
without a remedy. Absent substitute reparations, this situation was
intolerable. 5 Although some considered government liability an
adequate alternative to the liability of government officials, holding
the government liable meant overcoming the bar of sovereign
immunity. The enactment of the FTCA by Congress in 1946 and
subsequent developments in jurisprudence and legislation towards
governmental liability marked a major breakthrough.
4 6
Some U.S. legal scholars consider the movement from official
liability to government liability desirable for the injured plaintiff
because it results in compensation in almost every case.47 Gov-
ernmental liability, however, leaves the taxpaying public paying for
most of the damages that result from governmental activity.
48
The arguments previously discussed in the context of tort
40. Id. at 573.
41. 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
42. Id. at 458; see also Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa.
1978) (abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania).
43. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 458, 460.
44. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 573-74.
45. Id. at 568.
46. See id. at 568-69.
47. Id. at 575.
48. Id. at 575-76. "Public tort liability will be replaced by what amounts to a
governmental-operated system of mutual insurance for those damaged by administrative
action." Id. at 575.
1996]
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liability are also applicable to the problem of criminal liability of
government officials. A trend exists towards governmental liability
replacing individual official liability. Because of this development,
comparing the structure of corporate criminal liability, with the
development and organization of governmental criminal liability is
useful. A system of broad governmental responsibility, however,
means the practical elimination of the personal responsibility of
government officials. Even in those types of cases to which
immunity of government officials does not apply, plaintiffs will
prefer to sue the government and avoid the defendant's inability to
pay in case of execution of a judgment.4 9
B. Criminal Liability of Government Officials in Germany
1. Introductory Remarks
Although the German Criminal Code does not specifically
hold government officials criminally liable for failing to execute
their duties in environmental protection, such a failure may
constitute an environmental crime." Government officials are
also citizens, and are not exempt under criminal law. In principle,
if their actions are criminal, the government can punish them like
other citizens. Courts also have held that the government can
49. Id. at 575-76.
50. See Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code] § 324 (1989) (water pollution is an
environmental crime); see ULRICH WEBER, STRAFRECHTLICHE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT
VON BORGERMEISTERN UND LEITENDEN VERWALTUNGSBEAMTEN IM UMWELTRECHT,
WORZBURG, KOMMUNALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES FORSCHUNGSZENTRUM 19 (1988); Bernd
SchUnemann, Die Strajbarkeit von Amitstragern im Gewdsserstrafrecht, WISTRA
(ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFT, STEUER, STRAFRECHT), Nov. 15, 1986, at 235; KLAUs
TIEDEMANN, DIE NEUORDNUNG DES UMWELTSTRAFRECHTS 44 (1980); Rolf Keller, Zur
strafrechilichen Verantwordichkeir des Amtstragers ftir fehlerhafte Genehmigungen im
Urnweltrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR KURT REBMANN ZUM GEBURTSTAG 257 (Heinz Eyrich
et al. eds., 1989); Wolfgang Winkelbauer, Die strafrechtiche Verantwortung von
Amistraigern im Umweltstrafrecht, 4 NEUE ZErrSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 149, 150 (1986);
Hero Schall, Umweltschutz durch StrafrechL Anspruch und Wirklichkeit, 20 NEUE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1263, 1268 (1990); Volker Meinberg, Amtstrilgerstrafbarkeit bei
Urnweltbehorden, 36 NEUE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2220,2221 (1986); Gfinther Heine & Volker
Meinberg, Empfehlen sich Anderungen im strafrechtichen Uraweltschutz, insbesondere in
Verbindung mit dem Verwaltungsrecht?, VERHANDLUNGEN DES SIEBENUNDFONFZIGSTEN
DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGE 57-58 (1988).
Commentators have suggested the introduction of a specific environmental crime for
government officials. See WEBER, supra at 18-19; Herbert Trondle, Verwaltungshandeln
und Strafrerfolgung-Konkurrierende Instrumente des Umweltrechts?, 10 NEUE FUR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 918, 925-27 (1989); Schtlnemann, supra at 235; Meinberg, supra at
2221; Heine & Meinberg, supra at 55.
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punish officials who wrongfully issue permits or tolerate illegal
pollution for crimes other than failure to protect the environment,
such as the perversion of justice and endangerment through the
emission of poisonous substances. 51 The possibility of prosecuting
a government official is especially important in view of the
interweaving of German administrative and criminal law. Because
German criminal law generally imposes liability only in the absence
of a permit, the government cannot punish a polluter under the law
if he has a permit, however wrongful his .detrimental conduct. 2
Therefore, exempting from criminal prosecution an official who
issued the permit would severely impair use of the criminal law to
control environmental pollution. The government official also
contributes to environmental pollution by not enforcing compliance
with environmental regulations. If control is insufficient or totally
lacking, potential polluters have no incentive to comply. In the
presence of ineffective control of pollution, the question of whether
government officials can be held liable under criminal law merits
attention.
Three distinguishable situations exist in which a government
official may be criminally liable for environmental pollution: (1)
neglecting a duty to public utility enterprises, such as sewage
purification plants; (2) neglecting a duty by wrongfully issuing
permits; and (3) failing to intervene in cases of illegal pollution.53
The first of these three categories has no bearing on the exertion
of control over pollution by private individuals. If an official
neglects a duty regarding public utility enterprises, and such neglect
causes environmental damage, the general rules of criminal liability
51. See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [Penal Code] [StGB] § 336 (F.R.G.) (perversion of
justice); Amtsgericht [County Court] Frankfurt, Neue Zeitschrift far Strafrecht 72, 75-6
(1986); Landgericht [District Court] Hanau, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 181
(1988). Commentators have severely criticized the application of § 336. See Meinberg,
supra note 50, at 2223; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 54-55. Commentators also
have criticized §§ 223-233 (causing bodily harm) and § 303 (causing damage to property).
See Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50 at 59-60.
52. See Schtlnemann, supra note 50, at 235; TIEDEMANN, supra note 50, at 42;
Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 149-50. German Criminal Code § 330a (serious
endangerment through emission of poisonous substances) is an exception to this rule. See
TEDEMANN, supra note 50, at 41.
53. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 20-21. Of course, this is only one of several possible
classifications. For other classifications, see Hans-Joachim Rudolphi, Primat des Strafrechts
im Umweltschutz?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT, May 15, 1984, at 193, 198;
Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150.
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will punish such an official.5 4 The remaining two categories are
relevant, and the following sections discuss criminal liability for
wrongfully issuing permits and the possibility of holding govern-
ment officials criminally liable for non-intervention in cases of
illegal pollution.
2. Criminal Liability for Wrongfully Issuing Permits
A preliminary question is how to determine whether the
issuance of a permit is wrongful. Generally, a criminal court is not
totally free to decide this question. The court cannot apply
independent criteria related to criminal law, but rather must apply
administrative law. Because governmental agencies and officials
have relatively large discretionary power in issuing permits, the
criminal court has only a marginal right to examine the execution
of this power. Thus, the issuance of a permit is wrongful only if
administrative law clearly does not allow it and the official's
extensive discretionary powers cannot justify the permit's issu-
ance.
55
a. Cases in which Government Officials Are Not Liable
Two exceptions exists to the general rule that government
officials are criminally liable for issuing permits wrongfully. The
first exception concerns those sections of the German Criminal
Code that do not address all persons, but only certain groups of
people under specific circumstances (Sonderdelikte).6  For
instance, section 325 (air pollution and noise), section 327 (operat-
ing an installation without a permit), and section 329(1) and (2)
(endangering areas in need of protection) of the German Criminal
Code only apply to those who operate certain installations.' This
54. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 22-23; Tr6ndle, supra note 50, at 918-19; Schall, supra
note 50, at 1269; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2222; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at
57.
55. See Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeals] Frankfurt, Juristische Rundschau 168
(1988); Keller, supra note 50, at 247-48; Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199; Winkelbauer,
supra note 50, at 152-53; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2225-27; Heine & Meinberg, supra
note 50, at 59.
56. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 34-35.
57. Id. at 34-35; Keller, supra. note 50, at 253; Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150;
Eckhard Horn, Strafbares Fehlverhalten von Genehmigungs und Aufsichtsbecharden, NEUE
WOCHENSCHRIFT, Jan. 12, 1982, at 3-4; Schall, supra note 50, at 1269; Meinberg, supra
note 50, at 2223; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58. Commentators have argued that
this standard needs to be changed. See Keller, supra note 50, at 253-57.
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exception also precludes prosecution for inciting or abetting.
Because the polluter has a permit and his actions therefore are
justified, the polluter committed no crime for the official to have
incited or aided and abetted." The only exception to this rule is
the case in which a permit is null and void. 9
The second exception involves permits that are wrongfully
issued but nonetheless effective until revoked, because incrimina-
tion can occur only when the perpetrator lacks a permit. Such is
the case with German Criminal Code section 325 (air pollution and
noise), section 327 (operating an installation without a permit), and
section 328 (handling nuclear fuel without a permit). Because the
polluter has an effective permit, he has committed no crime.
Consequently, for lack of a criminal offense, the government
official who issued the wrongful permit cannot be punished for
inciting or aiding and abetting.6° This holds true even in cases
where the polluter obtained the permit by means of fraudulent
misrepresentation, bribery, or extortion.6'
b. Cases in which Government Officials Are Liable
If a government official issues a permit, and authorities
subsequently declare the permit null and void after the permit
holder polluted the environment, the official may be criminally
liable.62 Because the permit is null and void under administrative
law, courts treat it as if it never existed, and therefore the permit
has no bearing in the criminal context.' Consequently, the
authorities can punish the polluter,, in principle, for his actions, and
punish the official as an accessory to the crime for having issued
the permit.'
58. See Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58;
Keller, supra note 50, at 253.
59. See Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150; Keller, supra note 50, at 253; infra part
II.B.2.b.
60. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 37-38.
61. See id. at 67.
62. German Code of Criminal Procedure § 44 (1965); see Keller, supra note 50, at 247;
WEBER, supra note 50, at 38-39.
63. See WEBER, supra note 50.
64. See Schilnemann, supra note 50, at 240; WOLFGANO WINKELBAUER, ZUR
VERWALTUNGSAKZESSORIETAT DES UMWELTSTRAFRECHTS 67-68 (1985); Winkelbauer,
supra note 50, at 151-52; WEBER, supra note 50, at 38-39; Schall, supra note 50, at 1266;
EDWARD DREHER & HERBERT TRONDLE, STRAFGESETZBUCH UND NEBENOESETZE § 324
nab (1991).
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If an official wrongly issues a permit, it will nevertheless
remain in effect until the public authorities revoke it.65 For
crimes that do not contain the clause "without a permit," or a
similar clause, the fact that there is an effective permit does not
automatically preclude application of the criminal provision. For
instance, German Criminal Code section 324 (water pollution) and
section 326(1) (waste disposal that endangers the environment)
contain the word unbefugt (unauthorized), which, according to the
prevailing opinion, means "unlawfully," not "without a permit."' '
Thus, a water polluter still cannot be punished because the
presence of an effective, although wrongful, permit constitutes
justification. Consequently, the government official cannot be
prosecuted for complicity, because there is no criminal offense to
which the official can be an accessory. An exception exists in the
case where the permit holder obtained the permit by means of
fraudulent misrepresentation, bribery, or extortion.
Because a violation of the criminal law has occurred, however,
and the wrongfully issued, yet effective, permit only protects the
perpetrator, the authorities can convict the issuing official of an
"indirect offense" (mittelbare Taterschaft). Using the previous
example, the permit issuer thus committed the crime of water
pollution through the actions of a justified middle man, the permit
holder.67
3. Criminal Liability for Non-Intervention
A court interpreting sections of the German Criminal Code
would expect a violation to occur only by a positive act. Failure to
intervene or act, however, is also a crime when, for example, an
actor is polluting water. A prerequisite for this kind of criminal
liability is the legal obligation to act to prevent the pollution from
65. See WEBER, supra note 50.
66. Id.
67. See Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeals] Frankfurt, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift 2757 (1987); see also WEBER, supra note 50, at 39-42, 150-51; Winkelbauer, supra
note 50, at 151; Schtlnemann, supra note 50, at 238-39; Horn, supra note 57, at 3-4;
Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2222; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58. Weber,
however, dissents from this prevailing opinion. He constructs the criminal liability of the
government official by stating that the wrongful permit is not a ground for justification, but
just a (personal) ground for excuse, thus creating the possibility of prosecuting the
government official who issued the wrongful permit, while at the same time preventing
punishment of the permit holder. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 42-48; see also
WINKELBAUER, supra note 64, at 72-73; Schtlnemann, supra note 50, at 240.
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taking place. This is called a Garantenstellung (position of
guarantor).6'
Two different kinds of guarantorship exist. First is the
position of guarantor that follows from previous ac-
tions-Garantenstellung aus Ingerenz.69 An example of this kind
of guarantor, also called a Jberwachungsgarant (guarantor of
surveillance), is the official who issues. a permit." Second is a
position of guarantor that arises when the official assumes a
general duty to protect the environment against danger and
damage.7' In this case, the official need not issue a permit at all,
or commit any other act to be held liable.72 This is called a
Beschiitzergarant (guarantor of protection).73
The criminal courts must respect the large discretionary
powers of government officials, and may examine those powers
only marginally within the scope of criminal law. Therefore, if
administrative law allows an official to be passive, criminal law
cannot introduce an obligation to act.74 Section 330 of the
German Criminal Code (grave endangerment of the environment)
is an exception where an obligation to act under criminal law limits
the official's discretionary powers.75
The following sections discuss a government official's criminal
liability from a guarantorship of surveillance and of protection.
The following also addresses another possible modality of criminal
liability for non-intervention--criminal liability for not reporting
environmental crimes to the police.
a. The Government Official as Guarantor of Surveillance
German legal literature acknowledges that those who create
68. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 49; Horn supra note 57, at 5.
69. Horn, supra note 57, at 5.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Tr6ndle, supra note 50, at 922; Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199; Winkelbauer,
supra note 50, at 152-53; Horn, supra note 57, at 7, 10; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2227;
Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 59; Judgment of April 27, 1987, Beschwer-
deentscheidung der Generalstaatsanwalt Celle, cited in Natur und Rech 188-190 (1990)
[hereinafter Generalstaatsanwalt]. For examples of the influence on criminal liability of
non-intervention by agencies in cases of water pollution, see DIETER GENTZCKE,
INFORMALES VERWALTUNGSHANDELN UND UMWELTSTRAFRECHT 4-6 (1990).
75. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 54.
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a danger are obligated to prevent damage that may result from
their actions. By issuing a permit, a government official creates the
risk that the permit holder might violate provisions of criminal law.
The official therefore has an obligation to act if these violations
occur and result in illegal pollution. For instance, the official must
act if a permit holder pollutes more than the permit allows, or if
the permit should not have been issued in its present form.76
In a water pollution case, the Court of Appeals in Frankfurt
held that the belatedly-established wrongfulness of a permit forced
the agency to revoke the permit if its revocation would prevent
further deterioration of the water quality."
The guarantor of surveillance does not necessarily have to be
the same official who issued the permit. The guarantorship is
attached to the office.78 Consequently, the official responsible for
permits for environmental pollution is a guarantor even in those
cases where not he, but a predecessor, issued the permit."
b. The Government Official as Guarantor of Protection
As opposed to the clear obligation of guarantorship of
surveillance, whether a government official has a general duty to
prevent damage to the environment is unsettled. Jurisprudence
and some scholars favor protection, while others oppose it.'
In another water pollution case, the District Court of Bremen
decided that the director of a water resources board was a
guarantor of protection because the Water Resources Act made
76. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 51. Of course, the government official must act only
if administrative law also compels him to act. See also Trondle, supra note 50, at 923-24;
Schtlnemann, supra note 50, at 243-44; Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199; Winkelbauer, supra
note 50, at 151-52; Horn, supra note 57, at 6; Schall, supra note 50, at 1269; Meinberg,
supra note 50, at 222-24; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58-59.
77. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1987 at 2757. Again,
this rationale only holds in cases where the agency must act according to administrative law
and if it does not have discretionary power to justify its inactivity.
78. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 52.
79. See Id.; Trondle, supra note 50, at 924; Schtlnemann, supra note 50, at 245; Horn,
supra note 57, at. 6; Schall, supra note 50, at 1269; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2224.
80. Commentary in favor of protection includes: Landgericht [District Court] Bremen,
Neue Zeitschrift ftr Strafrecht 164 (1982); Generalstaatsanwalt, supra note 74, at 188-90
(1990); Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 151-52; Horn, supra note 57, at 6, 9-10; Meinberg,
supra note 50, at 2223-24; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58-59. Commentators
opposed to protection include: WEBER, supra note 50, at 56-57; Trdndle, supra note 50, at
922-23; Schilnemann, supra note 50, at 243-44; Schall, supra note 50, at 1270.
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illegal water pollution prevention one of the director's duties."'
As described in section 38 of the Water Resources Act and section
324 of the Criminal Code, because the director had power to
control and prevent pollution and arrange legal relations, he had
the duty to prevent the detrimental consequences.'
In an ironhydroxide water pollution case, the Attorney
General in Celle held that the water resources board was appoint-
ed to guard the purity of water.83 The board had control and
surveillance powers. This led the Attorney General to conclude
that the water resources board officials had the position of
guarantor of protection."
c. Failure to Report Environmental Crimes to the Police
Because section 138(1) of the German Criminal Code (not
reporting planned crimes) does not list environmental crimes,
government officials are criminally liable only if section 258
(frustration of punishment) or section 258a (frustration of punish-
ment in office) of the Code applies. These sections would apply if
the law compelled the official to report environmental crimes to
the police. No such duty, however, exists in either criminal or
administrative law.'. Although ministerial or other internal
guidelines may create such an obligation to inform the police of
crimes or suspicion of crimes, 6 sections 258 and 258a do not take
such guidelines into consideration.' Scholars continue to debate
whether government officials should have a duty to report
environmental crimes to the police.88
81. Landgericht [District Court] Bremen, Neue Zeitsehrift fur Strafrecht 164 (1982).
82. Id.; see WEBER, supra note 50, at 55-56.
83. Generalstaatsanwalt, supra note 74, at 188-90.
84. I&
85. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 58-61; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2225; Heine &
Meinberg, supra note 50, 59-60.
86. Examples of such guidelines include the proclamation of the Bavarian Home Office
of January 21, 1981, and the so called decree of cooperation in Northrhine-Westfalia of
June 20, 1985. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 61; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 186;
id., Resolution 34(b) of the 1988 German Law Congress, at 289-90 (1988).
87. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 60-61; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2225; Heine &
Meinberg, supra note 50, at 59-60.
88. See, e.g., TIEDEMANN, supra note 50, at 42; Schall, supra note 50, at 1272-73.
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4. Amtstragerstrafbarkeit in German Legal Doctrine: A
Summary of the Viewpoints
Looking at the problem from a policy perspective, the
possibility of holding government officials criminally liable goes
largely unchallenged in German legal doctrine. The position of
government officials does not differ from that of other citi-
zens-the normal rules of criminal law and liability apply. An
important reason for prosecuting government officials is that the
authorities often cannot prosecute the polluter himself because his
permit justifies or excuses his conduct. By targeting the
government official, illegal pollution will not go unpunished. 9
Holding government officials criminally liable, however, may
be counterproductive. For instance, officials may become overly
careful in executing their duties, thus inhibiting the effective
weighing of environmental and socio-economic concerns in
deciding the scope of permits.9° Opponents of this argument,
however, do not believe the drawbacks of criminal liability
outweigh the benefits. Opponents argue that the possibility of
prosecution encourages government officials to execute tasks with
a justified amount of care.91  In view of the deference criminal
courts give to the official's discretionary powers, the extent of
liability to which officials are presently exposed is not great enough
to cause the suggested counterproductive effects. 2  Another
argument against criminal liability is that the administrative
authorities would be less inclined to inform the judicial authorities
of environmental crimes for fear of being prosecuted themselves.'
Again, the threat of liability is so minimal that the fear of liability
resulting in failure to inform authorities of such crimes is not
strong enough to outweigh the benefits of criminal liability.9'
89. See Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2221; Schflnemann, supra note 50, at 235-36.
90. See Schu-nemann, supra note 50, at 235-36; WEBER, supra note 50, at 18-19; Schall,
supra note 50, at 1269; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 193-94.
91. See Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199; TIEDEMANN, supra note 50, at 46-47.
92. See Schall, supra note 50, at 1269-70; Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199. Until now,
only once has an official of an environmental protection agency been finally convicted for
an environmental crime. See Ginther Heine, Die Verwaltungsakzessorielt im deutschen
Umweltstrafrecht unter Beriucksichtigung des osterreichischen Rechts, 1991 JZ 376; Heine &
Meinberg, supra note 50, at 58. Cf. Trundle, supra note 50, at 919; Schall, supra note 50,
at 1269; Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2221.
93. See Schall, supra note 50, at 1269; Rudolphi, supra note 53, at 199.
94. See Schall, supra note 50, at 1269.
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With respect to the suggested introduction of a specific crime
for neglect of duty by officials in environmental protection
agencies, the counterproductive effects outweigh the advantages.95
Additional arguments, however, exist against specific incrimination
of government officials for environmental offenses. For instance,
some argue that the agencies concerned are not environmental
protection agencies at all, but rather environmental regulation
agencies, which weigh a clean environment and wealth equally. A
legislator can change this position by mandating a clean environ-
ment as the more important goal. So long as no legislation exists,
authorities should not punish government officials for choosing
wealth over clean water in a specific case, unless they violate
general provisions of the criminal law.96 The problem of govern-
mental official liability arises in other areas of the legal system, and
criminalizing the wrongful issuance of permits only in one sector is
unjust.97 Curious, however, is that the introduction of a specific
crime for government officials has been posited in order to limit
the criminal liability to just such A provision. 8
Similar arguments, arise regarding the introduction of a
criminal provision, obligating government officials to report any
known environmental crimes to the police or the District Attor-
ney 's office. Scholars argued that *such an obligation would
disrupt the working relationship between the environmental
agencies and polluters holding or requesting a permit.9  The
potential polluter would no longer trust the issuing agency and its
officials. The polluter's obligation to provide the agency with the
information it desires poses an additional problem. If the agency
had a duty to inform the police of environmental crimes, providing
the agency with such information could lead to self-incrimina-
tion. ° To remedy this problem, some have suggested that
95. See Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 149; Keller, supra note 50, at 257; Heine &
Meinberg, supra note 50, at 147.
96. See Meinberg, supra note 50, at 2226-27; WEBER, supra note 50, at 19;
Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150; Tr6ndle, supra note 50, at 919, 926; Heine & Meinberg,
supra note 50, at 57, 146-47.
97. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 19; Winkelbauer, supra note 50, at 150; Heine &
Meinberg, supra note 50, at 57.
98. See Tr6ndle, supra note 50, at 919.
99. See WEBER, supra note 50, at 19-20; Schall, supra note 50,.at 1272; Meinberg, supra
note 50, at 2221.
100. See Schall, supra note 50, at 1272; WEBER, supra note 50, at 62.
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government officials have discretionary powers 0 1 to create at
least an obligation to report violations of section 330 (grave
endangerment of the environment) of the German Criminal
Code.1 2
5. Summary of Liability of Government Officials
In theory, government officials generally are criminally liable
for wrongfully issuing permits and for choosing not to intervene
against illegal polluters under German law. The coexistence of
criminal and administrative environmental law, however, results in
few prosecutions because criminal courts must respect the
discretionary power of administrative agencies. Until today, the
system has obtained only one final conviction of an environmental
protection agency official for an environmental crime. °3 This
fact, however, does not justify the conclusion that criminal liability
of government officials is irrelevant under German law. The mere
possibility of prosecution deters German civil servants who work
for environmental agencies from committing violations.
Some commentators do not believe the alleged drawbacks of
holding government officials criminally liable, such as exaggerated
carefulness, outweigh the benefits of criminal liability. These
drawbacks, however, have prevented the German legislature from
introducing a specific criminal law addressing neglect of duty or
failure to report environmental crimes to the police.
Finally, although this Article only discusses the status of U.S.
and German law, many other countries also have considered
imposing criminal liability on government officials for environmen-
tal crimes."
101. See Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 157-58; Schall, supra note 50, at 1272.
102. See TIEDEMANN, supra note 50, at 43.
103. See Heine, supra note 92, at 376.
104. For a discussion of Belgium's approach, see MICHAEL G. FAURE, DE STRAF-
RECHTELIJKE TOEREKENING VAN MILIEUDELICTEN 93-114 (1992). For the approach in the
Netherlands, see CORNILIE WALING, DAS NIEDERLANDISCHE UMWELTSTRAFRECHT 95-97
(1991). For a comparative overview, see the national reports prepared for the preparatory
colloquium of the AIDP on crimes against the environment, 65 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 731-
1195 (1994).
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III. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFIcIALS IN CONTROLLING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
This part provides an economic analysis of the different
mechanisms that authorities can use to enforce environmental
protection regulations. Specifically, this part examines how the
liability of governmental officials fits into the general framework
of environmental regulation. First, a summary of the economic
commentaries explains the current structure of environmental
quality regulation and the various legal mechanisms used to control
pollution.
A. An Economic Analysis of Environmental Pollution: Basic
Concepts
Industrial activities sometimes are simultaneously socially
desirable to many and detrimental to others because they cause
environmental pollution. Those side effects are the well known
externalities.'0 5 Industrial activity imposes costs or harmful effects
on third parties without their consent.
According to many authors, environmental pollution repre-
sents a classic example of an externality.' 6 An enterprise will
not take into account the side effects that its industrial activities
cause because it does not directly suffer from the harmful ef-
fects.1 7 Without intervention by the legal system, the enterprise
has no incentive t9 reduce activity that damages the environment.
The economic function of environmental law, then, is to provide
incentives to such industries, encouraging them to consider these
negative side effects in making a cost-benefit analysis and deter-
mining what degree of care it will afford under the circumstanc-
es."' This incentive, in turn, impacts the scope and method of
the polluter's intended activity.
Economists refer to this process as "internalizing the
externalities."'" In the past, when industrial pollution existed on
105. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (3d .ed. 1986).
106. See, e.g., ROB TEIJL ET AL., INLEIDING RECHTSECONOMIE 40-43 (1989); see also
Michael G. Faure, Milieubescherming door aansprakelijkheid of regulering?, 39 AA 759,760
(1990).
107. See Faure, supra note 106, at 760.
108. Id.
109. See TEUL, supra note 106, at 41-43.
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a small scale, achieving a minimal degree of pollution without legal
interference would have been possible. The Coase Theorem" e
provides that the potential injurer negotiates with the potential
victims and reaches an agreement that reduces the environmental
pollution in a way that achieves allocative efficiency.' Interven-
tion of the legal system is unnecessary because the externality of
the environmental damage is internalized automatically. The
Coase Theorem, however, relies on the assumption that transaction
costs are zero."
12
The Coase Theorem can provide a solution in some instances
of environmental pollution, such as those involving few victims.
113
For example, the Coase Theorem applies in a situation such as one
factory causing harm to a few, well-informed neighbors. In many
cases of environmental pollution, however, the victims are
innumerable and an entire society may suffer the consequenc-
es.'14 In addition, the actual cause of pollution is not always clear
because different enterprises contribute different types of pollution.
In these cases, the transaction costs are high and the Coase
Theorem is inapplicable because the assumption of zero transaction
costs is inaccurate. Consequently, the scope of modern day
pollution requires intervention by the legal system.1
5
110. This theorem is the starting point of the "new" law and economics. See R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960).
111. Id.
112. The transaction costs involve the costs of negotiation, collecting information, and
enforcement. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECObOMICS (1988); see
also Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Efficienties van her foutcriterium in het
Belgisch aansprakelijkheidsrecht, 1987-1988 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 62-68; A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCrION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983).
113. For the application of the Coase Theorem in the environmental context, see
POSNER, supra note 105, at 54-57; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 42-53 (1987).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549
(W.D.N.Y. 1988). Throughout a period of 11 years polluters dumped more than 21,000
tons of waste of various origins and quality in the northern part of the state of New York,
known as Love Canal, which resulted in enormous health problems. See also New York
v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing how General
Electric dumped between 400 and 500 55-gallon barrels containing hazardous waste in the
Glenn Falls area, resulting in serious damage to soil, air, and natural resources).
115. See Faure, supra note 106, at 159 n.10; Michael G. Faure, The EC Directive on
Drinking Water InstitutionalAspects, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND
INSTITUTIONS: THE ATRAZINE CASE STUDY 39 (L. Bergman & D.M. Pugh eds., 1994).
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B. Liability or Regulation?
The legal system can control environmental pollution by
imposing either liability or regulation. The goal of either system
is to encourage potential polluters to make investments to reduce
environmental damage." 6 Contrary to the Coase Theorem, the
potential polluter will not automatically make these investments,
which represent "the level of efficient care," because cases of
environmental pollution involve positive transaction costs.
Threatening liability is one way to internalize damages.'
1 7
Economic analyses of tort liability demonstrate that the specter of
liability gives parties an incentive to use "efficient care. 1 18 These
incentives lead to a minimization of the social costs of accidents
and, thus, to a maximization of social welfare.
Authorities may apply this system of incentives to the tort of
environmental pollution. 9 Authorities can use the threat of
potential liability to force potential polluters to invest in environ-
mental protection techniques that equal a standard of efficient
care." In the alternative, the government could set an efficient
standard of care through regulations. Authorities could enforce
these regulatory standards through administrative or criminal
sanctions. Most current environmental regulatory schemes use a
combination of liability laws and safety regulations.
Professor Steve Shavell indicates four criteria to determine the
efficiency of liability versus regulation. 2 ' First, Shavell discusses
the possibility that private parties and regulatory authorities have
116. On the theory of regulation, see generally ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL
FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994).
117. See Faure, supra note 106, at 159.
118. Guido Calabresi provided the first suggestion for an economic analysis of liability
rules. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. Liability rules
should not only lead all parties in the accident setting to take efficient care, but also to
adopt an optimal activity level-neither a negligence nor a strict liability rule are optimal.
See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980)
[hereinafter Shavell, Strict Liability].
119. See Faure, supra note 106, at 761.
120. For the determination of the level of efficient care, see Shavell, Strict Liability,
supra note 118; SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 118.
121. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 359 (1984).
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different levels of knowledge regarding hazardous activities."
Private parties often do not fully understand the benefits and costs
of reducing risks, nor the probability and the severity of risks.
When private parties do fully understand these factors, however,
liability laws effectively encourage self-regulation. Where the
regulator possesses information superior to that of private parties
and the courts, however, direct regulation is more effective."
Second, Shavell discusses the situation in which private parties
are incapable of paying for all of the harm they have caused." 4
In that case, liability laws do not furnish adequate incentive for
private parties to control risks. Although the laws may impose
liabilities that exceed the assets of private parties, they treat such
losses as being limited to the value of those assets. Because the
required amount of efficient care is proportionate to the amount
of damages, insolvency of the potential injurer results in ineffective
deterrence."z Indeed, because the injurer views any accident as
having a total magnitude equal to his assets, he will only take
enough precautions to avoid that accident. The standard of
"efficient care," however, may be much higher."'
In a system using regulations, assets are irrelevant because the
regulations require private parties to reduce risks as a precondition
for engaging in their activities. Such regulations prevent a business
willing to ignore safety regulations from operating. If authorities
rely on monetary penalties to induce private parties to comply with
regulations, however, regulations, like liability laws, would be
ineffective to deter those unable to pay. Hence, only safety
regulations, enforced by nonmonetary sanctions, are effective in all
cases.
Shavell's third criteria addresses the possibility that few
plaintiffs will sue polluters, despite laws providing standing to sue
environmental polluters.Y If few polluters are sued, the deter-
rent effect of liability laws decreases and polluters no longer have
122. Id
123. Id.
124. Id. at 360.
125. Id at 362, 368.
126. Note that Landes and Posner correctly indicated that this problem is more serious
under a strict liability rule than under a negligence rule. Under a negligence rule, the
injurer still has an incentive to take optimal care as long as the costs of taking optimal care
do not exceed his assets because he can avoid paying damages.. See LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 113.
127. Shavell, supra note 121, at 363.
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the incentive to reduce risks. The possible reasons victims do not
sue polluters are threefold. First, victims may not pursue a suit
because the harms that the alleged polluter generates are widely
dispersed, thereby making legal action financially unfeasible for any
individual victim." Second, environmental harm often does not
manifest for a long period of time, creating evidentiary problems
for the victim-plaintiff-29  Third, victims often have difficulty
attributing harm to the parties responsible for producing it."'
For these reasons, many victims never sue environmental polluters,
despite the seriousness of the damage the polluters have
caused. 3 Therefore, liability laws do not give polluters enough
incentive to take the necessary precautions to meet the standard of
"efficient care."
Shavell's last factor examines the magnitude of administrative
costs to private parties and the public in using the tort system.
This factor favors liability laws over regulation because liability
laws only incur administrative costs when harm occurs. Regulation,
on the other hand, incurs administrative costs steadily, whether or
not harm occurs. In addition, the polluter in a tort suit must pay
administrative costs directly, whereas society as a whole pays
regulatory administrative costs. Because the polluters themselves
must pay, liability laws are a more effective deterrent.
After examining the four factors, Shavell concludes that two
factors generally favor liability-administrative costs and differen-
tial knowledge-and two favor regulation-incapacity to pay for
harm and escaping suit."'
Most Western European environmental statutory systems use
a combination of liability laws and regulations. Substantial
regulation exists because liability laws alone do not adequately
reduce environmental risks." In addition, with respect to the
differential knowledge determinant, regulatory agencies often have
far better access to, or a superior ability to evaluate, relevant
ecological and technological knowledge. Regulatory agencies have
this superior ability because of the high cost of developing and
maintaining expertise and research regarding the danger of an
128. Id.
129. Id. at 361.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 365-66.
133. id. at 368-71; Faure, supra note 106, at 763-66.
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activity to the environment.'1 Another advantage to regulation
is that regulatory agencies can do the research once and then pass
it on to industries. In this way, the regulatory agency can set the
efficient environmental standard through a regulatory horm. Thus,
regulatory agencies can hold industries to a thoroughly researched
standard, rather than allowing an industry to regulate itself.
Regulation is also more effective when an industry is unable
to pay for the harm it has caused. Explosions, oil spills, or the
release of toxic agents or radioactive substances into the environ-
ment cause harm that can easily exhaust the assets of even the
largest corporation. Insolvency dilutes the deterrent effect of
liability laws.'35 Moreover, the potential insolvency of a polluting
corporation generally limits liability to the assets of the corporate
entities.
136
As mentioned earlier, the minimal likelihood that potential
polluters will be sued, because environmental harms often manifest
only after many years, similarly dilutes the deterrent effect. In
such cases, victims may have difficulty assembling the necessary
evidence because those responsible may have retired or died, or
the corporations themselves may have gone out of business.
Moreover, as tracing environmental harms to particular causes is
frequently difficult, tracing harms to particular corporations can be
exceptionally hard. Thus, latency and causation problems often
hinder civil lawsuits for environmental damages.
Although the above arguments favor regulation, the threat of
liability is still necessary to complement regulation. Regulation
alone does not always lead to an efficient result. As discussed
earlier, public choice effects, which are inherent to any government
regulation, and the lack of total compliance often lead to inefficient
results. 37  An effective environmental regulatory scheme,
therefore, must incorporate both liability and regulation. 3 8
C. Regulation and Enforcement
Authorities most frequently use monetary sanctions to enforce
environmental regulations in civil, administrative, and criminal
134. See Shavell, supra note 121, at 368-71; Faure, supra note 106, at 763-66.
135. See Shavell, supra note 121, at 368-71; Faure, supra note 106, at 763-66.
136. See Shavell, supra note 121, at 368-71; Faure, supra note 106, at 763-66.
137. See Faure, supra note 112, at 160.
138. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
54-58 (1991) (asserting tort law can be a complement to statutory regulation).
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laws. t39 According to economic literature, cases of monetary
sanctions are justified when relatively high damages occur and a
relatively low chance of catching the offenders exists. 4' A
sanction exceeding the magnitude of the harm is necessary because
the probability of being caught for violating a regulatory norm is
less than one.
The formula for deciding how large the fine (D) must be to
serve the purpose of deterrence, if the chance (P) that the
authorities will catch the offender and force him to pay is less than
one, is D = LIP, where L equals the harm to the offender.1 4' If
P = 1, L and D are equal, assuming a risk neutral offender. If,
however, L = $10,000 and P = 0.1, meaning that nine times out of
ten the offender escapes the clutches of the law, then D, the
optimal fine, is $100,000. Only then is the expected cost to the
prospective offender-PD--equal to the harm of his act-L.
Thming to criminal law, consider how the environmental
offender perceives the costs of crime. The economic analysis of
criminal law presupposes that a rational prospective offender is a
profit maximizer. This offender weighs both the costs and the
benefits of committing a crime and does not undertake illegal
action unless the expected benefits of the crime exceed the
expected costs.42  Therefore, increasing expected costs should
139. See Johannes C. Oudijk, Die Sanktionen im niederllindischen Gesetz aber Wirt-
schaftsdelikte und deren Anwendung im Umweltstrafrecht, WISTRA, June 10, 1991, at 161-68
[hereinafter Oudijk, Die Sanktionen]; Johannes C. Oudijk, De sancties in het economisch
milieustrafrecht, in ZORGEN VAN HEDEN OPsTELLEN OVER HET MILIEUSTRAFRECHT IN
THEORIE EN PRAKTUK 371, 381 (Michael G. Faure et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Oudijk,
De sancties]; Heine & Meinberg, supra note 50, at 61-63. Some legal systems, including
those of the Netherlands and Germany, do not provide for punitive tort damages. Thus,
according to the law of these nations, only public officials, and not private actors may
impose monetary sanctions on polluters. Therefore, in the following, the term "fine"
includes punitive tort damages as well as administrative and criminal fines.
140. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1201-09 (1985).
141. See id. at 1203.
142. The prospective offender does not consider real costs but his own subjective
perception of this reality, the expected costs. Therefore, although tainted by a party's own
subjective beliefs, reality does influence this expectation. See ROGER BOWLES, LAW AND
THE ECONOMY 57 (1982); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLOM. L. REV. 1232, 1241 (1985) [hereinafter
Shavell, Criminal Law]; Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 438-44, 452-54 (1990) [hereinafter Shavell, Deterrence]; MICHAEL
ADAMS & STEVEN SHAVELL, Zur Strafbarkeit des Versuchs, Goltdammer's Archiv fPr
Strafrecht, Aug, 8, 1990, at 337, 341-42, 345-46, 348; Oudijk, De Sancties, supra note 139,
at 374.
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deter a prospective offender. In calculating the expected costs, two
important factors are the probability of authorities catching, and
convicting the offender (P), and the expected maximum punish-
ment (S). The multiplication of these factors then constitutes the
expected cost of a crime (C), so that C = PS. Increasing P or S
will increase C to a level where it exceeds the expected benefits.
If for example S = $100,000 and P = 0.01, then C = $1,000. By
raising either the probability of getting caught, or the expected
maximum punishment by a factor of 2, the expected costs double
(C = 2C). The two ways to obtain this result, however, are not
equally easy to achieve. Increasing the expected maximum
punishment demands less effort from the government than
increasing and subsequently stabilizing the probability of catching
the offender. Concurrently, increasing punishment rather than the
probability of catching offenders inflicts less cost on society.' 43
From an economic viewpoint, fines and other monetary
sanctions are efficient because they are relatively cheap to
administer.'" They also directly diminish profit, and in doing so
strike at the heart of the motivation for committing environmental
crimes.
145
This analysis leads to the initial conclusion that monetary
sanctions are an efficient method to deal with environmental
regulation violators. Environmental crimes, however, often involve
a relatively high amount of damage. The cost of complying with
environmental protection regulations is usually very high as well,
while the likelihood of catching offenders is relatively low.
Additionally, where parties cause harm much greater than their
ability to pay, the expected benefits from illegal pollution are very
high. For these reasons, monetary sanctions may not be an
adequate deterrent.46 This shortcoming of monetary sanctions
is particularly relevant in the environmental context. In that
context, the optimal monetary sanction required for deterrence so
143. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth
Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 618 (1991); ADAMS & SHAVELL, supra note
142, at 353; Oudijk, De Sancties, supra note 139, at 375.
144. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment an Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT'3, 13-14 (Gary S. Becker & William M.
Landes eds., 1974); POSNER, supra note 105, at 209 (1986); Shavell, Deterrence, supra note
142, at 439.
145. See Oudijk, De Sancties, supra note 139, at 375.
146. The insolvency problem is one of the arguments for choosing regulation over
liability. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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frequently exceeds the offender's assets that nonmonetary
sanctions, such as imprisonment, are necessary.47
The working relationship between the enterprise and the
employee who is convicted and fined reveals another shortcoming
of monetary sanctions. If the enterprise pays the fines that an
authority has imposed on the employee,"~ the deterrent effect is
diluted. In light of these considerations, authorities should employ
more than mere monetary sanctions for violations of environmental
regulations.
The factors discussed above have important consequences in
determining the best enforcement system to induce compliance
with environmental regulations. Authorities can impose both
criminal and administrative monetary sanctions. 49 An adminis-
trative agency, however, cannot impose nonmonetary sanctions,
such as imprisonment. According to the European Convention for'
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, only
an impartial judge following a procedure proscribed by law can
impose nonmonetary sanctions.t 0  Hence, imprisonment is
available only as a criminal sanction, not as an administrative
sanction. These factors affect the ability to use criminal law to
enforce environmental regulations.
147. The economic literature usually interprets nonmonetary sanctions to be imprison-
ment. See Shavell, Criminal Law, supra note 142, at 1235.
148. According to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act
of 1988, in any tort suit brought against a federal employee for actions within the scope of
his employment, the Upited States will be substituted is the defendant and the plaintiff 's
rights will be determined in accordance with the FTCA. Pub.L. No. 100-694,102 Stat. 4562
(1988). Section 2679(d) of the United States Code provides that tort recovery from the
employee is specifically foreclosed. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d). Paying someone else's fines
constitutes a criminal offense in Germany. STGB § 258(11); see HANS HEINRICH
JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL 699 (4th ed. 1988);
DREHER, supra note 64, at § 258, n.9. This rule, however, is very hard to enforce because
tracing cash flow between individuals and between individuals and-agencies is very difficult.
D. HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA & J. REMMELINK, INLEIDING TOT DE STUDIE VAN HET
NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT 610-11 (11th ed. 1989); see also Weekblad van het Recht 8345
(March 5, 1906) (judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court); Weekblad van het Recht 8492
(Jan. 21, 1907) (holding that a judge cannot make it a prerequisite that the fine is paid by
the defendant); Michael G. Faure & Glnther Heine, The Insurance of Fines: the Case of"
Oil Pollution, THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 39, 43-44 (1991).
149. Civil law tan also impose a monetary sanction exceeding the amount of the harm
done-punitive damages-but most European legal systems do not provide for such a
sanction.
150. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. and Fundamental
Freedoms done, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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D. Criminal .Law and Environmental Crimes
Although criminal law-can impose nonmonetary sanctions such
as imprisonment, applying criminal law to environmental crimes
can be problematic due to the structure of environmental legisla-
tion. Characteristic of structures addressing environmental crimes
is an interweaving of administrative and criminal law.15t Such
structures use permits and licenses extensively, mostly accompanied
by specific administrative requirements, to define environmental
crimes. Agencies then decide the permitted degree of pollution,
thereby determining the scope of environmental crime provisions.
Indeed, an examination of environmental crimes in new, Western
European environmental statutes reveals that authorities generally
only punish the lack of a permit, or a violation of emission
standards."'
Additionally, no general rule prohibits polluting. Polluting
only constitutes a crime when it violates an administrative norm,
and even if a general position existed, compliance with a permit is
usually sufficient justification. Because most environmental crimes
consist of a violation of these administrative norms, the administra-
tive agency that sets the emission standards determines what kind
of behavior is criminal.
This type of structure may be economically sound because the
administrative authorities have an informational advantage over a
judge in an individual criminal case. 53 The alternative would be
to consider all pollution a crime, leaving the judge to decide which
acts warrant punishment. In most cases a regulatory agency has
either superior knowledge of, or far better access to, relevant
ecological and technological information than a judge. Requiring
a judge to acquire expert knowledge of chemical and toxic
substances, and keep up-to-date with recent developments in the
field of environmental science, would be very inefficient, if not
impossible. Moreover, administrative agencies acquire information
that benefits a large number of people and diminishes the costs of
151. In German literature, the phenomenon of interweavement between administrative
and criminal law is called Verwaltungsakzessorietat. See generally WINKELBAUER, supra
note 64; Heine, supra note 92.
152. See generally Heine, supra note 92.
153. For an argument on the informational advantage, see Shavell, Regulation, supra
note 121, at 358-60; Faure, supra note 106, at 763-64.
558 [Vol. 18:529
Imposing Criminal Liability on Officials
research for society.'" Thus, the current structure of relying on
administrative agencies to determine environmental crimes appears
economically sound. Administrative law, however, cannot be the
sole source of enforcement because nonmonetary sanctions are
necessary to deal with environmental regulation violations.
E. Public-Choice Effects
The previous analysis assumed that regulation by public
authorities serves the public interest. It also assumed that agencies
always act to achieve the highest possible level of welfare for the
largest possible number of people. Therefore, a government only
will regulate when it is efficient according to the above mentioned
determinants.'55 Additionally, the agencies that issue pollution
permits are not expected to be self-serving.
In reality, however, authorities sometimes issue a regulation
even though it appears to be inefficient or, if the regulation itself
is not necessarily inefficient, the contents are. Moreover, even if
the regulation in a given case seems efficient, the agency's
implementation can be inefficient. "'Public Choice" economists
have examined these effects'56 using micro-economic models to
explain the process of regulation, studying the government official
or agency itself as a profit maximizer. This approach postulates
that one can view a government official as a homo economicus,
which means that the regulator prefers to issue regulations favoring
certain political pressure groups that have something to offer in
return. Such political incentives include political power, employ-
ment advantages, status, and so on. Consequently, the Public
Choice school views regulation as a result of supply and demand
on the political market. On the demand side, several interest
groups want regulation that is favorable to them. On the supply
side, politicians try to maximize their profits. The product is
regulation that protects interest groups in exchange for political,
economic, and financial support. Therefore, lobbying is an
important factor in creating legislation.
Powerful lobbying groups tend to influence regulation in such
154. Faure, supra note 106, at 764.
155. See Shavell, Regulation, supra note 121.
156. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Scl. 3,3-21 (1971); Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON.
93, 93-117 (1961).
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a way as to limit market entry. In this context, Stigler hypothesizes
that, as a rule, industries request authorities to impose regulations
which are predominantly written and applied to its advantage.'
15
Some industries succeed in using the civil service to their advan-
tage. State power to impose taxes or grant subsidies, and the
power to issue coercive regulation relating to market entry in a
certain branch of industry or profession, are forms of government
intervention which are in great demand.15 This is also the case
within the scope of environmental regulation, where frequently
very strict pollution-control requirements only apply to new firms
entering the market due to. grandfather clauses. Maloney and
McCormick illustrate the tighter restrictions on new firms:
The 1970 Clean Air Act and its amendments imposed standards
on existing pollution sources as a function of the ambient air
quality, while new firms had to meet the strictest standards
regardless of local air quality. Moreover, the ambient air
standards have been the tightest in the cleanest air regions,
further restricting the entry of rivals.
159
The influence of lobbying on environmental law is evident not
only in regulations, but also in the individual pollution permits.
Almost every environmental statute features the extensive use of
permits and licenses accompanied by specific administrative
requirements. The same lobbying activities therefore effect the
process of issuing both permits and licenses, and the contents of
such permits and licenses. In the latter case, however, the so-called
"capture theory," rather than the interest group theory of govern-
ment, explains the success of lobbying. The capture theory predicts
that the subjects an administrative agency is intended to control,
under certain conditions, will control the agency 60 This capture
happens because civil servants, who regulate the industry, depend
on the information that the industry supplies in order to execute
their duties and identify themselves with the regulated industries
157. Stigler, supra note 156, at 3.
158. Moore, supra note 156, at 93-95.
159. Id. at 101; see also Sierra'Club v. Ruchelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 258 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
323, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
160. For information on the capture theory, see A.F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF
GOVERNMENT (1908); M. UTrON, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATING INDUSTRY 26-27
(1986).
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they control.
Consequently inefficiencies might occur in environmental law
as a result of Public Choice effects. The inefficiencies are present
both in the drafting of the regulations and in the process of issuing
permits and licenses based on environmental statutes. The
problems often arise because administrative agencies have broad
discretion in* fixing the concrete emission standards for the
individual polluting firm. Agencies have great discretionary power
to make th6 permit standards either strict or more lenient because,
in most environmental laws, license issuing requirements are very
broadly formulated and do not seriously limit the agencies' power
to set standards freely. Thus, the current structure of environmen-
tal law allows the industry to capture the agency easily because an
agency need merely to use the discretionary power, granted by law,
to favor the industry.
Clearly, this structure is potentially inefficient because the
captured agency might set too lenient an emission standard, thus
allowing the industry to take less than efficient care. As a result,
an internalization of environmental damages will not take place
completely. Thus, exerting control over the process of issuing
permits and licenses, and observing specific administrative permit
requirements, followed by strong enforcement in case of violation,
leaves something to be desired.
A possible defense against overly lenient standards set by a
captured agency would be to draft stricter general statutory rules
that limit the discretionary power of the regulatory agency or the
individual government official. 62 For example, stricter rules
could prohibit any emissions into the environment without a permit
and restrict the issuance of these permits. Stricter rules, however,
161. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & Roger VAN DEN BERGH, OBJECrIEVE AANSPRAKEL-
UKHEID, VERPLICHTE VERZEKERING EN VEILIGHEIDSREGULERING 148 (1989).
162. Another possibility is to use tort liability as a stop-gap for failing regulation,
although judicial second guessing of administrative decisions has several disadvantages as
well. For the similarities between licenses and tort law, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note
138; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA, THE REFORM
OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 223-43 (1992); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Environmental Liability Law, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
AND LIABILITY 118-31 (1992); Michael G. Faure & M.H.S. Ruegg, Environmental Standard
Setting Through General Principles of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK 53-57
(Michael G. Faure et al. eds., 1994).
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do not provide an effective solution because, as mentioned above,
political pressure will effect the drafting of these general rules.
1
In addition, as long as governments employ licenses or permits,
officials will retain enough discretion to allow industries to apply
political pressure to obtain permits. Thus, regulation that merely
limits the discretionary power of the agency cannot cure the
inefficiency regulation that lenient licensing and emission standards
cause.
F Criminal Liability of Government Officials
The individual government official's use of discretionary power
to issue permits or impose specific permit requirements causes
inefficient environmental regulation. If a government official issues
too lenient a permit, the polluter often is not criminally liable
because permit violations are the only source of individual polluter
criminal liability. Thus, the government agent's granting of the
permits protects the polluter's action and contributes to the
pollution of the environment. This reality explains the increasing
interest in criminal liability for government officials within legal
systems that rely on an interweaving of administrative and criminal
law to protect the environment. Because agents are subject to
political pressure, and because criminal law does not punish
polluters who possess permits, the attempted enforcement of
environmental regulations will be ineffective. The key question,
therefore, is whether the captured agent should be criminally liable
for wrongfully issuing a permit that results in pollution.
Government officials will issue permits and licenses in
accordance with environmental legislation only if they have
sufficient incentives. Imposing sanctions would force the govern-
ment official to observe "efficient care" in issuing permits and
imposing requirements." The question, then, is how to impose
sanctions in such a way as to force government officials to exercise
optimal care.
Holding government officials civilly liable for harms that stem
from issuance of defective permits poses the same problems
163. See Michael Maloney & Robert McCormick,2 A Positive Theory of Environmental
Quality Regulation 5 J.L. ECON. 99, 99-123 (1982); see also FAURE & VAN DEN BERGH,
supra note 161, at 163.
164. See Shavell, Regulation, supra note 121, at 359; Shavell, Criminal Law, supra note
142, at 1235; Faure, supra note 106, at 761-62; ROGER BOWLES & P. JONES, PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 64 (1989).
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mentioned earlier in the context of a polluter's inability to pay. In
view of the often extensive damage that environmental pollution
causes, the official might be unable to pay for the harm he or she
caused, especially when the total amount of damage exceeds his or
her assets. Moreover, plaintiffs most likely will not sue the official
because the harm is widely dispersed and trial costs for the victims
are high.
Regulation is another possible way to provide sufficient
incentives for government officials. Regulation by means of, or
controlled by, administrative enforcement would be ineffective,
however, because such a system creates a vicious circle. Govern-
ment officials would have to exert control over and impose
administrative sanctions on other government officials.165 Conse-
quently, government officials must be held criminally liable for
issuing defective permits and licenses that cause environmental
pollution. Criminal liability of government officials for issuing
permits wrongfully fits into the general framework of regulatory
enforcement of environmental law.
In summary, the weakness of current environmental law lies
in its attempt to base criminal liability on administrative law, the
so-called Verwaltungsakzessorietdt. When agencies issue permits
wrongfully, polluters are not subject to criminal liability because
the permit justifies their acts. Only criminal sanctions against a
government official who wrongfully issues permits, thereby
contributing to the pollution of 'the environment, can cure this
inefficiency.
G. Agency Liability Versus Personal Liability
The question of whether the agency, the government official,
or both, should be criminally liable mirrors the question of
whether, in corporate liability, a corporation or the responsible
employee should be liable. There are three possible ways that laws
can impose criminal liability on public authorities. Criminal law
can hold liable only the agency, only the individual official involved
in the violation of the law, or both the agency and the individual
agent.
165. Empirical research reveals that the effectiveness of administrative sanctions is
minimal because of the strong ties between the controlling official and the regulated
official. See Volker Meinberg, Empirische Erkenntnisse zum Vollzug des Umweltstrafrechts,
ZEOTSCJROFr FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 112, 150 (1988).
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From an economic point of view, designating the liable party
is unimportant so long as the sanctions are freely transferable and
the parties are fully informed. With transferable sanctions, either
the agency charges to the liable official the imposed fine it paid, or
the official asks the agency for reimbursement of the fine he paid.
Choosing to impose the fine on either the official or the agency is
unimportant because the contractual relationship between the
official and the agency governs such matters.1"
Criminal law, however, provides nonmonetary sanctions, such
as imprisonment, to adequately enforce environmental regulations.
Clearly, authorities may not inflict nonmonetary sanctions on an
entire agency. Also, governmental agencies may be equally unable
to pay for the damages caused by the pollution it authorized. As
in the case of polluters, the agency also may escape suit because
the damage to the environment is widely dispersed and therefore
difficult to trace. This causes high trial costs for victims of environ-
mental pollution and, hence, fewer suits. Monetary sanctions may
exceed the agency's assets and thus not be an effective deterrent.
Because monetary sanctions are just as ineffective applied to
agencies as to polluters, and because nonmonetary sanctions are
inapplicable to agencies, nonmonetary sanctions must apply to
individual government officials. 7 U.S. legal authors argue in
favor of individual liability of government officials in the area of
tort law. The level of control over a public official decreases when
agency liability replaces individual liability. The government
official who must pay damages out of his own pocket is less likely
to act wrongfully than one who knows he will not be responsible.
A system of broad governmental responsibility overlooks the need
for individual liability of government officials, in practice as well as
in theory. At least in the cases of government official fraud,
corruption, or malice, the law should not protect the government
166. Even monetary sanctions are not always freely transferable between the employer
and the employee in a contractual relationship because sometimes the law prohibits the
practice.
167. Polinsky and Shavell are currently making the economic argument. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given
the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 239, 239-57 (1993); see
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1345-92 (1982) (discussing
principal-agent relationship).
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official from personal liability." Even in the case of government
official negligence, however, liability should exist to serve as a
check. Thus, in addition to government liability, individual
government officials should be personally liable for wrongful acts.
Governments should maintain agency liability alongside
individual liability because the agency establishes the guidelines
and policy rules for the individual official to follow. In this regard,
the agency is in the best place to exert an effective degree of
control over its officials and their decision making. The threat of
sanctions is necessary to urge the agencies to issue prudent
guidelines and exert effective control. These sanctions, however,
must be monetary because incarcerating agencies is impossible.
An important principle in tort law, which is also relevant in
this context, is that of respondeat superior. Respondent superior
means that an employer is strictly liable for the torts of his
employees committed in furtherance of the employment.1 9 The
employer, however, is strictly liable only for damages that result
from negligence on the part of his employees. If an employee has
exercised due care but still causes damage, the victim has no claim
against the employer.
In economic literature, the respondeat superior inquiry focuses
on the problem of insolvency. For example, because the. employee
is often unable to pay for the damage he caused, liability imposed
on him alone is ineffective. Holding the employer strictly liable for
damage caused by the employee's negligent behavior provides
adequate incentives to force the agency to exert effective control
over its employees. The employer can threaten termination, or
refuse any promotion, as an inducement for careful conduct. 70
In the context of environmental regulation, from an economic point
of view, liability of the individual government official in combina-
tion with that of the agency is the most effective solution.
168. Under California Government Code § 825.6, a public entity is entitled to
indemnification from an employee for any amount paid because of the employee's fraud,
corruption, or malice. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 825.6 (West 1996); see SCHWARTZ, supra note
1, at 76 n.8.
169. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
170. LANDES & POSNER, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851,914 (1981).
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS AN
OPTIMAL SOLUTION?
This Article examined the increasing tendency of some legal
systems, especially the German legal system, to hold government
officials personally liable for the pollution their behavior causes.
Prosecution of government officials has become especially
important, given the interweaving of criminal and administrative
law. Because punishing a polluter with criminal sanctions is only
possible when the polluter violates an administrative regulatory
norm (such as an obligation to have a license), the administrative
authorities have an immense impact on what level of pollution to
prosecute. An administrative authority that sets emission standards
too low or does not exercise effective control will severely impair
the achievement of environmental policy goals. Hence, many
environmental lawyers believe that personal liability of government
officials is necessary to encourage government officials to take due
care when issuing licenses and setting emission standards.
U.S. and German legal systems have seemingly opposing views
on the liability of government officials, In the United States,
criminal liability for government officials does not exist. Neverthe-
less, the evolution of U.S. tort case law framed this Article's
discussion of civil liability of officials. Although absolute liability
*of government officials existed at common law, case law evolved
towards immunity of the official. The present standard is qualified
immunity, which provides that the official can be liable if he knew
or should have known that his action violated constitutional rights.
Although the liability of the individual official moved from full
liability to qualified immunity, liability of the government itself
exhibited the opposite trend. Originally, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity protected the state against civil law suits, but eventually
legislative and jurisprudential actions seriously restricted this
doctrine.
German law imposes criminal liability on government officials
for. negligence. Criminal liability is possible in theory; in practice,
however, to date there is only one final conviction of an environ-
mental protection agency official. The wording of the
incriminations in the German Criminal Code is the primary cause
of this discrepancy. German literature has discussed whether to
include in the Criminal Code a specific provision punishing
government officials for neglect of duty, as well as a duty to report
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environmental crimes to the police. Critics, however, argue that
such a specific provision would have a paralyzing effect on public
administration.
Presenting an economic analysis of law, this Article examined
how an increasing interest in government official personal liability
could fit into the general framework of environmental law. The
inquiry began by explaining some basic notions behind the need for
criminal laws to enforce environmental law. The current structure
of environmental criminal law in Western European countries is
characterized by an interweaving of criminal and administrative
law. The "capture" theory explains why governmental agency
officials are inclined to issue licenses too easily or to set require-
ments too low. The "capture" of agencies by regulated industries
creates inefficiencies because if the "captured" agency sets
inefficiently low standards the system never achieves a full
internalization of environmental damages. Hence, the inquiry
focused on instruments that government structures may use to
counter the capturing of agencies. Criminal liability of government
officials is a device that gives agents incentives to take due care in
the licensing process.
Thus, understanding why legal scholars show an increasing
interest in holding government officials criminally liable is easy.
Criminal liability of government officials does not provide us with
all the answers and, on the normative level, Amtstragerstrafbarkeit
is not necessarily a solution to all problems of environmental
policy. Many questions still exist. For instance, explaining why the
German legal system generally accepts criminal liability of
government officials while U.S. legal doctrine seems to oppose the
idea is difficult. One explanation is that Germany's law does not
accept criminal liability of corporations and agencies, and must turn
to the punishment of the individual official. The U.S. legal system,
however, accepts criminal liability of legal persons, such as
corporations, thus diminishing the need for punishment of the
individual official. On the other hand, U.S. law does not recognize
the criminal liability of governmental agencies, so liability of legal
persons alone does not fully explain the differences in acceptance
of criminal liability of government officials. Further inquiry may
explain the economic reasons behind the seemingly opposing views
of each legal system.
Another point that merits further research is the possible
application of Becker's classic theory of crime to government
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officials.'71 In applying this theory, and in calculating the benefits
of criminal behavior, any benefits the official gains when he favors
a regulated industry are difficult to see. Additionally, defining a
due care standard for licensing behavior is difficult. Precisely
because the official has vast discretionary powers, proving that he
used his powers in a negligent way, and should therefore be liable,
is also often difficult. Indeed, none of the cases discussed herein
involved clear bribery of an official. In some cases, courts did not
require plaintiffs to prove bribery and showing that the official
wrongfully used his powers to allow pollution to continue was
enough. The difficult question arises as to what standard to apply
in judging the behavior of the government official.
Others have proposed holding government officials criminally
liable in the context of enforcing environmental regulations. This
proposed analysis is based on utilizing the administrative structure
of the environmental regulatory scheme of issuing permits and
licenses. Based on a marketable pollution rights model, as has
been suggested by some economists, some of these problems might
disappear with a modem, economically sound legal approach to
protect the environment.'
One, however, should not forget that in the pollution rights
model, administrative agencies continue to play an important role.
Even if government officials do not set emission standards through
permits, government officials could still intervene, for example, to
determine pollution rights, control transfers, and control use of
attributed rights. Hence, the question of criminal liability of
government officials is also important in a pollution rights model.
In the current system of control through permits and licenses,
the government official plays a crucial role. Pursuant to environ-
mental statutes, it is the official who determines the acceptable
level of pollution warranting the issuance of a permit or license.
Hence, the official is a crucial link in the chain of control over
environmental pollution. Because this link may be weak due to
the "capturing" of an agency, criminal liability of government
171. See generally Becker, supra note 144.
172. See A. Nentjens, Markiconform milieubeleid, ECONOMISCH STATISTISCHE
BERICHTEN 401-05 (1988); J. Klaus, Umweltdkonomie und Umweltpolitik, in OKOLOGIE,
OKONOMIE UND JURISPRUDENZ 6-8 (Edgar Wenz et al. eds., 1987); BRUCE ACKERMAN
ET AL, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 260-81 (1974); Jan
Bongaerts & Andreas Kraemer, Water Pollution Charges in Three Countries, 1 EUR. ENV'T
REV. 12, 12-19 (1987).
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officials offers a viable solution to counter the "capturing" effects.
One, however, should note that there are less drastic solutions to
counter the capturing of an agency than using criminal law, such as
promoting the independence of the agency. In addition, a change
in environmental law that makes it possible to punish the polluter
if he causes "serious" pollution despite his license also could
counter the capture of agencies. If this change occurred, the
dependence on administrative rules would diminish, along with the
need to make government officials criminally liable. As an
alternative to using criminal law to regulate the behavior of
government officials, such officials could become elected represen-
tatives and thus politically accountable.
One should not exaggerate the possible role of criminal law in
deterring government officials in the environmental arena.
Although in theory the threat of criminal prosecution would lead
to extra caution and an effective level of control over the govern-
ment official, the detection rate and the likelihood that the state
would prosecute is uncertain. The public prosecutor, to a large
extent, has to depend on government officials as his eyes and ears.
Because of this dynamic, a prosecutor most likely will be unable to
prosecute his colleagues for violations of criminal law. In practice,
polluters rarely receive severe criminal sanctions, especially
imprisonment, so it seems unlikely that government officials who
issued the license would suffer these harsh sanctions.
The responsibility and crucial role of government warrants the
liability of government officials for their failures. Further research,
however, is necessary to investigate several pending questions.
Criminal law remains a useful complement to other legal instru-
ments, such as civil liability and administrative enforcement, in
implementing and enforcing environmental law.
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